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Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting 
Docket No. 09-115
Argument Date: December 8, 2010 
From: The Ninth Circuit 
by Jessica E. Slavin and Alyssa Johnson
Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee, WI
CASE AT A GLANCE 
An Arizona law makes it a violation of Arizona law for employers to hire unauthorized aliens. Violators may 
be sanctioned by the loss of their licenses to do business in the state, including revocation of their articles 
of incorporation. The law also requires employers to use a federal electronic employment verification 
system to check whether new hires have the right to work in the United States. The Supreme Court will 
consider whether such a law is preempted by federal law. 
I M M I G R AT I O N
May State Law Take Away an Employer’s Right to Do Business in the State  
as a Penalty for Employing Unauthorized Aliens, When Federal Law  
Handles Such Violations Differently?
ISSUE
Does the federal government’s scheme for regulating the employ-
ment of aliens in the United States preempt an Arizona law that may 
suspend the business license of an employer who knowingly employs 
an unauthorized alien?
FACTS
The petitioners are a group of business owners, civil rights lawyers, 
and immigrants’ rights groups, who sought an injunction against 
enforcement of Arizona’s Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) based on 
facial constitutional challenges. This appeal concerns the petitioners’ 
claims that LAWA is preempted by the federal Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). The respondents are various govern-
ment officials, including the Arizona county attorneys who, under 
LAWA, are charged with enforcement of the provisions outlawing 
employment of unauthorized aliens.
Relevant History of Federal Regulation of Employment of Aliens
Prior to Congress’s 1986 enactment of IRCA, states were free to 
sanction the employment of unauthorized aliens, in exercise of their 
“broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employ-
ment relationship to protect workers within the State.” De Canas v. 
Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). The parties concede that the states’ power 
to regulate the employment of aliens was significantly narrowed by 
the passage of IRCA, which states expressly that “[t]he provisions of 
this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal 
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those 
who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthor-
ized aliens.” With IRCA, Congress created a broad federal regulatory 
scheme designed to combat the employment of unauthorized aliens 
by requiring employers to review identification documentation to con-
firm new hires’ right to work in the United States, i.e., by completing 
the now-familiar I-9 form. The IRCA scheme includes a set of civil and 
criminal penalties, along with procedures by which employers may 
protect themselves by documenting their efforts to verify employees’ 
right to work. Good faith compliance with the I-9 procedures generally 
provides employers with a defense against IRCA sanctions. 
During the debate surrounding the passage of IRCA, various members 
of Congress expressed concern that sanctioning the employment 
of unauthorized aliens would lead to unfair discrimination against 
applicants, for example, discrimination based upon appearance or 
manner of speech. To prevent such discrimination, the sanctions for 
employing unauthorized workers were matched with equally severe 
sanctions for unlawful employment discrimination. IRCA’s balanc-
ing act can be seen in the I-9 form itself; on the one hand, the form 
empowers employers to demand proof of work authorization, while on 
the other hand it restricts the types of identification documents that 
employers may demand as proof as well as the manner in which they 
may demand the documents. 
After the passage of IRCA, the numbers of undocumented immigrants 
in the U.S. fell sharply, but within a decade those numbers were 
again rising. In response to concerns that IRCA was failing to combat 
unauthorized employment, in 1996 Congress (as part of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)) 
directed the federal government to introduce a number of so-called 
“pilot programs,” which were alternative methods of verifying  
employment. The first pilot program, an electronic employment  
authorization system, still exists today and is now called “E-Verify.”  
E-Verify is an Internet-based system for verifying work applicants’ 
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work authorization. Employers who use E-Verify generally have a 
defense to federal sanctions for employing unauthorized aliens, just 
like employers who in good faith comply with I-9 requirements.
E-Verify began as an experimental, voluntary system, but in recent 
years it has increasingly become a requirement for some employers. 
From 2006 onward, states began passing laws requiring the use of 
E-Verify, and in 2008, the federal government began to require that 
all federal contractors use E-Verify. (Indeed, in its amicus brief, the 
United States acknowledges that in proceedings in another case, in 
a different legal context, it remarked in a brief that “[t]he State of 
Arizona has required all public and private employers in that State to 
use E-Verify * * *. This is permissible because the State of Arizona is 
not the Secretary of Homeland Security.” The United States points out 
in this case, however, that this past statement was made in a very dif-
ferent legal context, in which federal preemption of state regulation 
of alien employment was not at issue.)
The Legal Arizona Workers Act
The Arizona legislature passed the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) 
in 2007. Section 23-212 of the law prohibits Arizona employers from 
employing “unauthorized aliens,” relying on the federal scheme 
for determining which aliens are authorized to work in the United 
States. LAWA imposes various sanctions for violation of the section, 
depending on severity and repetition of the violation, with the most 
serious penalty being suspension of “all licenses necessary to oper-
ate the business” in the state. The definition of “license” is quite 
broad, defined in 23-211(7) to mean “any agency permit, certificate, 
approval, registration, charter or similar form of authorization that is 
required by law and that is issued by any agency for the purposes of 
operating a business in this state.” LAWA specifically includes articles 
of incorporation and certificates of partnership; professional licenses, 
however, are excluded. 
Section 23-214 requires all employers to use the E-Verify system for 
verification of employment authorization. Such use creates a “rebut-
table presumption” that the employer did not knowingly or intention-
ally employ an unauthorized alien. 
An action against an employer for violation of LAWA may be brought 
by an Arizona county attorney in the county in which the alleged un-
authorized employment occurred. Section 23-212(H) of LAWA specifi-
cally provides that in such actions, “the court shall consider only the 
federal government’s determination pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1373(c),” a 
federal statute that directs the Department of Homeland Security to 
verify a person’s citizenship or immigration status to federal, state, 
and local government agencies upon request. 
Procedural History of This Appeal
The case has a complicated procedural history, having begun as two 
separate actions, filed against the incorrect defendants and rais-
ing due process and First Amendment challenges in addition to the 
preemption issues. Eventually the cases were consolidated and were 
refiled against the correct defendants (the county attorneys). 
After hearing the parties’ arguments on the merits, the district court 
rejected all of the petitioners’ constitutional challenges. The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed, holding that LAWA falls within IRCA’s savings clause, 
which expressly permits states to regulate alien employment through 
“licensing and similar laws.” Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held, 
LAWA’s requirement that employers use E-Verify did not mean that 
LAWA was impliedly preempted by federal law because “Congress 
could have, but did not, expressly forbid state laws from requiring 
E-Verify participation.”
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 28, 2010. The parties 
agreed not to oppose the filing of amicus briefs, and numerous amici 
have filed briefs in support of each side. 
CASE ANALYSIS
The petitioners begin their argument with the Supremacy Clause’s 
provision that “the Laws of the United States shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding.” They argue that Congress specifically 
intended, with the passage of IRCA, to preempt state regulations like 
the one in Arizona. While acknowledging IRCA’s savings clause, the 
petitioners maintain that LAWA “is not a licensing scheme” but rather 
an alternative scheme for regulating employment of unauthorized 
aliens. They assert that the savings clause was intended to preserve 
particular licensing powers, related mostly to permission to employ 
migrant workers, and that such laws “impose [before the grant of a 
specific license] a condition of complying with other specified laws or 
regulations,” rather than suspending a business’s right to do business 
in the state. Characterizing LAWA as a licensing law would, according 
to petitioners, mean that the savings clause would swallow the rule—
i.e., would gut the preemption provision.
Moreover, claim the petitioners, IRCA impliedly preempts LAWA’s 
sanctions against employers for employing unauthorized workers, 
first, because it creates a state forum for adjudicating aliens’ right to 
work, and, second, because LAWA disrupts the careful balance Con-
gress struck between its interests in combating illegal employment 
and combating illegal discrimination. The petitioners cite Hoffman 
Plastics v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), in which, in the context of 
determining whether an arbitrator determining that an employer 
had violated a worker’s unionization rights could award backpay if 
the worker was an unauthorized alien, the Court described IRCA as 
“a comprehensive scheme that made combating the employment of 
illegal aliens in the United States central to the policy of immigration 
law.” In light of Congress’s intent to occupy the field of regulation of 
alien employment, the petitioners argue, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance 
on De Canas’s discussion of the presumption against preemption was 
misplaced. 
Particular amici supporting the petitioners press some related points 
even more strongly. The Asian American Justice Center cites research 
tending to show that, due to rates of response and error in E-Verify, 
Hispanics and Asians suffer disproportionately from unfair dis-
crimination when E-Verify is used. And in what is perhaps the most 
interesting amicus brief, legislators who were themselves involved 
in the drafting and enactment of IRCA in 1986 write in support of 
the petitioners’ view of the legislative history, arguing that LAWA is 
just the sort of law that Congress intended to clear away with IRCA’s 
comprehensive reforms.
In response, the respondents argue, first and foremost, that LAWA’s 
regulation of licensing in the state of Arizona falls squarely within 
IRCA’s savings clause and therefore cannot be preempted on any 
basis. The respondents note that nothing in the savings clause limits 
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the word “licensing” to any particular type of license, nor to the issu-
ance of licenses rather than the suspension of licenses. They assert 
that suspension of the right to do business is undoubtedly a form of 
licensing regulation. Furthermore, they stress that states have, and 
retain, strong police power in the regulation of employment to protect 
state citizens.
Concerning IRCA’s legislative history, the respondents note that legis-
lative history is irrelevant where the text is clear, and argue that the 
text here clearly permits LAWA’s license-based system of sanctions. 
Furthermore, the respondents quote language from a House Report 
on IRCA, which states that the legislation would not preempt state 
laws that “require [the] licensee … to refrain from hiring, recruiting 
or referring undocumented aliens.”
Next, the respondents argue that, in addition to being inconsistent 
with the express language of the preemption clause, the petition-
ers’ implied preemption argument fails because nothing in LAWA 
interferes with the operation of IRCA. LAWA, in the respondents’ view, 
simply imposes different, additional sanctions from those imposed by 
IRCA—licensing sanctions. Except for those sanctions, the respon-
dents argue, LAWA’s requirements harmonize with federal law. The 
absence of antidiscrimination requirements in LAWA does not change 
this fact, respondents assert, because the federal sanctions for dis-
crimination remain in full force.
As for the E-Verify program, the respondents emphasize that requir-
ing participation in E-Verify broadens participation in a program that 
the federal government has made available to employers nationwide, 
on a voluntary basis. Mandating participation in E-Verify thus, respon-
dents claim, cannot be interference with the achievement of federal 
objectives under IRCA or IIRIRA.
The amici supporting respondents likewise stress that LAWA’s 
requirements are consistent with, and in large part mirror, federal 
law, and thus, they argue, create no conflict with the federal immigra-
tion laws or IRCA. To the contrary, they assert, LAWA supports IRCA’s 
objectives—to prevent the employment of unauthorized aliens in the 
United States.
SIGNIFICANCE
The case is significant, first, to resolve the questionable validity not 
only of LAWA but of other, similar state laws. An amicus brief filed on 
by business organizations supporting the petitioners suggests that 
confusion and expense will result from allowing individual states to 
impose their own procedures for employment verification and sanc-
tions for violating such procedures. Employers could face the burden 
of compliance with a 50-state patchwork of employment verification 
procedures in place of the relatively simple, uniform federal scheme 
under IRCA and IIRIRA. In addition to the “patchwork” problem, a very 
real employment discrimination problem seems inevitably to result 
from increased reliance on the E-Verify system, according to the stud-
ies cited by certain amici supporting petitioners.
While a decision striking down LAWA might simplify matters for 
employers and better protect against employment discrimination, it 
would cut short state efforts to reduce employment of undocumented 
workers. Striking down LAWA would surely only heighten the tension 
between the federal and state governments with regard to federal 
efforts to control immigration and employment of undocumented 
workers. State lawmakers would be limited, perhaps, to imposing 
compliance with employment verification laws as a condition of the 
issuance of a license in the first place, but lacking any means to sanc-
tion employers who fail to comply.
Beyond resolving the validity of this particular statute, the decision 
in this case also may provide a significant precedent with respect to 
Congress’s reach in IRCA, and with respect to preemption in general. 
While Hoffman Plastics did not concern preemption, the Court there 
did label IRCA a “comprehensive scheme,” to support its conclusion 
that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) could not upset that 
scheme by awarding backpay to an unauthorized worker, even though 
the employer had violated the worker’s right to unionize. Will the 
Court now narrow IRCA’s reach, when it comes to Congress’s interest 
in controlling the rules regarding employment of aliens? 
Jessica E. Slavin is an associate professor of legal writing at Mar-
quette University Law School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In addition to 
legal writing and appellate advocacy, she teaches seminars in refugee 
law and in law and rhetoric. She can be reached at jessica.slavin@
marquette.edu or 414.288.7486. Alyssa Johnson is a second-year law 
student at Marquette University Law School. 
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